In this paper, generic Quasigroup sting transformation is analyzed and found vulnerable to Ciphertext-Only-Attack. Cryptanalysis of existing scheme is as important as building new ones. Most of those string transformations have not been implemented properly neither do they have security analysis. It is obvious that randomness and unpredictability is the requirement of every Cryptographic primitive.

Quasigroup String transformation is one of those primitives that have many applications in cryptographic algorithms, Hash functions, and Pseudo-Random Number Generators.

There is need for continues development of new and improvement of existing primitives. From a security point of view, the possibility of cryptanalysis is diminished significantly, as no party except communicating parties has any knowledge of the cryptographic parameters in use.Īlgebraic functions are the primitives that strengthen the cryptographic algorithms to ensure confidentiality of data and information. The algorithm performance is tested, and the overall performance is close to the performance of conventional encryption with a delay of about 16.52 CPU Cycles per message. The cipher suite in addition to the encryption key, changes systematically and securely with every new message, leaving the opponent with no enough information to launch any effective attack. These parameters are shared securely between communicating parties by utilizing some of the symmetric key bits. mode of operation, key length), are hidden from anyone except the legitimate receiver. The identity of the algorithm used to secure the current message, along with other cryptographic parameters (e.g. This is achieved by utilizing a set of sound existing symmetric encryption algorithms, namely, the Advanced Encryption Standard,MARS,RC6, Serpent and Twofish. This research paper introduces a novel symmetric encryption algorithm that provides the confidentiality security service without leaking enough information about the exact encryption algorithm or other cryptographic parameters to anyone except the legitimate receiver. Finally, the Statistical Test Suite (STS) recommended by the NIST has been used to ensure the randomness of the cipher output, and the cipher has passed all the STS tests. Furthermore, the proposed P-AES’s scores of the key avalanche and the plaintext avalanche were 0.496 and 0.504 respectively. Moreover, the resulting proposed cipher can operate in 128 different ways, which will significantly reduce the capabilities of any sophisticated attacker. The cipher resistance to differential and linear attacks has been proved. This means the cipher has an open design, and the security provided by the P-AES depends only on the secrecy of the encryption key. From a security standpoint, the proposed P-AES fully complies with Kerckhoff’s principle. P-AES has been implemented seamlessly using the existing AES modules, and the performance was more or less equal to the AES performance (71 and 70 milliseconds to encrypt 500 bytes using the P-AES and the AES respectively). Consequently, polymorphism has been achieved and interoperability remains intact. The receiver can retrieve the operations’ details from the encryption key.

Hence, with every new key, these transformations will operate differently. To achieve these objectives, the basic AES transformations, SubBytes, ShiftRows, and MixColumns, have been made key-dependent in the proposed P-AES. The exact values will be available only to legitimate communicating parties during execution time. In the P-AES, the AES parameters’ values will change with every new key. To secure various forms of data, a polymorphic variant of the Advanced Encryption Standard (P-AES) has been introduced.

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